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FILE SHARING, COPYRIGHT AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 
 
Enrico Bonadio * 
 
 
Abstract 
 
The article explores the relationship between copyright and freedom of speech in the 
Internet environment. After highlighting the constitutional dimension of these conflicting 
rights, the phenomenon of file sharing and the role of Internet Service Providers (ISPs), the 
author analyzes the debate surrounding a particular sanction used in certain jurisdictions to 
punish unauthorized on line sharing of copyrighted material, i.e. the disconnection of 
Internet access. The increasingly important role played by private agreements between 
copyright holders and ISPs is also highlighted. 
A set of proposals aiming at identifying possible areas of freedom for unauthorized file 
sharers are then analyzed. 
In particular, the author believes that file sharing technologies may boost the exchange of 
information, opinions and ideas amongst Internet users and foster a number of values 
underpinning the very protection of free speech. It is for this reason – the author argues - 
that copyright rules might be relaxed when it comes to file sharing technologies, e.g. by 
transforming copyright from a “proprietary” to a “compensation” right. 
 
 
1) Introduction 
 
This article explores the relationship between copyright and freedom of speech in the digital 
environment. In particular, the author looks at the well known phenomenon of file sharing 
on the Internet, which often involves the exchange of information protected by copyright. 
The author also explores how a possible conflict between copyright and freedom of 
expression emerges and may be settled in the Internet environment (also in light of the 
European Convention on Human Rights). After briefly highlighting the constitutional 
dimension of these conflicting rights and introducing the phenomenon of file sharing, the 
author turns his attention to the debate surrounding a particular sanction used in certain 
jurisdictions to punish unauthorized on line sharing of copyrighted material, i.e. the 
disconnection of Internet access. 
 
The author also analyzes the increasingly important role played by private agreements 
between copyright holders and Internet Service Providers (ISPs), i.e. a strategy of compelled 
voluntary collaboration currently pursued by certain copyright holders. This new strategy 
confirms that public law is not anymore the only vehicle through which copyright owners 
enforce their exclusive rights in the Internet context. 
 
Finally, a set of proposal aiming at identifying possible areas of freedom for unauthorized 
file sharers are analyzed. 
 
2) The constitutional dimension of the two conflicting rights 
 
Both freedom of speech and copyright have a constitutional dimension. 
 
Freedom of expression is strongly protected by all many countries’ constitutions. For 
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example, in the US free speech is protected by the First Amendment to the Constitution as 
well as by many states’ constitutions. Freedom of expression is also protected in the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights (Article 11), the European Convention on Human 
Rights (Article 10), the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (Article 19) and 
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Article 19). The importance of protecting free 
speech has also been stressed several times by the European Court of Human Rights, the 
European Court of Justice and the US Supreme Court. 
 
Also intellectual property rights (IPRs), and particularly copyright, are constitutionally 
protected in some countries (yet only a few industrialized countries’ constitutions expressly 
protect copyright). For example, Section 1(8) US Constitution states that “the Congress shall 
have the power to […] promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for 
Limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and 
Discoveries”. In Europe three national constitutions expressly define copyright as 
fundamental right1; in most other European states the constitutional nature of copyright is 
merely inferred by constitutional courts in their decisions2. 
 
Furthermore, copyright and IPRs in general are recognised as human rights in several 
international treaties, including the Universal Declaration of Human Rights3 and the 
European Charter of Fundamental Rights4. 
 
It is often said that copyright is constitutionally protected because it turns out to be “engine 
of free expression”, as it was stated by the US Supreme Court in Harper & Row5. Indeed, by 
granting authors exclusive rights for the commercial exploitation of works, copyright gives 
an important incentive for the creation and diffusion of music, literature, art, movies, etc. 
 
Yet, copyright is also capable of stifling freedom of expression. Indeed, copyright confers 
upon its owner exclusive rights, including the right to prevent copying or even access the 
whole or a substantial part of a protected work. For example, by relying on technology 
protection measures right owners can prevent people from accessing scientific articles 
published in online academic journals. In such a manner users can be prevented from 
accessing existing information, which in turn might negatively affect the ability of forming 
people’s own opinion and expressing it. Thus copyright can be used to restrict the free use of 
existing works and as a result it has the potential to limit the flow of information necessary 
to form and communicate personal opinions. In other words, the creation of subsequent 
works (“down-stream” creations) often relies on the possibility of accessing and studying 
previous works (“up-stream” creations). If access to existing works is hindered, 
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opportunities of coming up with new works are also likely to be reduced, which in turn may 
jeopardize the progress of our society’s cultural life. 
 
The fact that copyright has the potential of both enhancing and stifling freedom of 
expression has been labeled by Neil Netanel as the “copyright’s paradox” 6: indeed, 
copyright stimulates some speech (“up-stream” speech) while abridging other speech 
(“down-stream” speech)7. As will be shown later, in the digital environment it appears that 
copyright protection is more prone to stifling free speech rather than stimulating it. 
 
3) Internet access as human right 
 
As said above, the right to free speech is a fundamental right enshrined in several 
international instruments. 
 
In the current digital age people express their opinion and ideas via the Internet. It is in the 
web where people, organizations, artists, musicians, etc. find opportunities and chances to 
form, modify, tailor and express their ideas. Thus, gaining access to Internet has become an 
important prerequisite for people and organizations to acquire the knowledge necessary to 
form and express their opinions and creativity. Access to, and use of, Internet strongly 
enhances freedom of speech.  
 
It is therefore no surprise that there has recently been a push by the United Nations to make 
Internet access a human right. The right to Internet connection – also known as right to 
broadband – has been increasingly perceived as acquiring the same relevance as the right to 
other public goods, such as water, air, healthcare, education, etc. Internet has become vital in 
everyday life (e.g. for connecting families and friends, banking, shopping, earning a living, 
etc.) and positively affects the ability of people to communicate, work, manage finances, 
learn, and generally participate in the collective life of our society8. 
 
Finland has been the first country to introduce at constitutional level a legal right to Internet 
access9, and also Estonia recently passed a law stating Internet access as a fundamental 
human right of its citizens. Moreover, as will be shown later, in a decision of June 2009 the 
French Constitutional Court basically confirmed that the right to Internet access is a 
fundamental right10. Also the Constitutional Chamber of the Supreme Court of Costa Rica 
recently declared Internet access as essential for the exercise of fundamental rights11. 
 
At EU level Article 3-bis Directive 140/2009 is relevant12. This provision attaches great 
importance to the right to Internet access, and expressly makes reference to the fundamental 
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rights and freedom of natural persons enshrined in the European Convention on Human 
Rights (ECHR). 
 
4) File sharing, copyright enforcement and the role of Internet Service Providers  
 
One of the tools massively used to exchange information on line is file sharing. This 
technology refers to the sharing of computer data or space on a network. It allows multiple 
users to access the same file (containing data, audio and/or video) stored in a central server, 
giving the user the ability to read, modify, print or copy it. 
 
And what about “peer-to-peer” (P2P) file sharing? Peer-to-peer technology enables the 
sharing of files by a direct exchange between end-users’ computers. P2P networking means 
that the files are not stored on a central server. Instead, certain software which can be 
installed in individuals’ computers work as a server for shared files. This permits each 
computer which is equipped with the software in question to act as a mini-server from which 
other P2P users can download files. P2P’s popularity derives from the fact that it is user-
friendly and convenient. Such technology has empowered informal networks of file sharers 
to make files available to each other, around the world. Thus, P2P file sharing enables 
peoples around the globe to exchange information over the Internet by using machines 
connected through networks, which in turn allows a cheap and worldwide sharing of 
digitized information. 
 
As is known, these technologies often turn out to clash with copyright. Indeed, when they 
are used to share files containing copyright protected material, such activities are usually 
considered copyright infringement, and particularly a violation of the “communication to the 
public” and “making available” rights, which are reserved to copyright owners. Such rights 
are now protected by most countries as a result of implementing Article 8 of the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty and Articles 10 and 14 of the WIPO Performances and Phonograms 
Treaty. These provisions state that copyright holders enjoy the exclusive right to authorize 
any communication to the public of their works, including the making available to the public 
in such a way that members of the public may access these works from a place and at a time 
individually chosen by them. File sharing technologies – which allow the making available 
of copyright protected works to the public - have often been deemed by courts to fall within 
said provisions13. 
 
                                                                                                                                                      
taken by Member States regarding end-users access’ to, or use of, services and applications through electronic 
communications networks shall respect the fundamental rights and freedoms of natural persons, as guaranteed 
by the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and general 
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European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and with general 
principles of Community law, including effective judicial protection and due process. Accordingly, these 
measures may only be taken with due respect for the principle of the presumption of innocence and the right to 
privacy. A prior, fair and impartial procedure shall be guaranteed, including the right to be heard of the 
person or persons concerned, subject to the need for appropriate conditions and procedural arrangements in 
duly substantiated cases of urgency in conformity with the European Convention for the Protection of Human 
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms. The right to effective and timely judicial review shall be guaranteed”. 
13
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right, in Alain Strowel (Edited by), Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, 
Edward Elgar (2009), pp. 43-70, at p. 45. 
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Copyright owners have regularly enforced their exclusive rights by taking legal action 
against those who uploaded, downloaded and generally shared copyright protected material 
with other peers, especially music and movies files. Such actions have often been successful. 
 
In addition to taking action against individual files sharers (“primary infringers”), right 
owners often chase “secondary infringers”, i.e. those companies or organizations which 
permit or encourage primary and direct infringement by individual file sharers, or build up 
the technical means which make said direct infringement possible. These are called Internet 
Service Providers (ISPs) and – to the eyes of copyright owners - they often act as gatekeeper 
and make possible individuals’ file sharing of copyrighted protected material. 
 
Liability is therefore not limited to people who personally infringe copyright, i.e. who 
upload and make available the files in question. As it happens with other kinds of tort, liable 
is also who encourages, facilitates, helps or anyhow benefits from carrying out an unlawful 
act. Copyright makes no exception to this rule. Indeed, several legislations consider liable 
for copyright infringement whatsoever person or organization connected to primary 
infringements, being them music halls (which broadcast music from the radio), copy shops 
(which allow the copying of protected material) or ISPs which offer users the technical 
means to share and make available infringing files14.  
 
It should be noted however that both EU (see Articles 12-14 Directive 2000/31) and US 
legislations (see Section 512 of the 1998 Digital Millennium Copyright Act) have created an 
exemption for ISPs and other Internet intermediaries, by shielding them from liability for 
copyright infringement committed by others, provided certain conditions are met15. 
 
5) Repositioning file sharing: not only copying music and movies 
 
As already said, copyright owners have taken a large number of legal actions in many 
countries against companies, ISPs or even individuals providing or using file sharing 
network services. Many legal actions – especially those actions involving the unauthorized 
sharing of music or movies files – are well known and have already been commented16. 
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 Allen N. Dixon, Liability of users and third parties for copyright infringements on the Internet: overview of 
international developments, in Alain Strowel (Edited by), Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in 
Copyright Law, Edward Elgar (2009), pp. 12-42, at p. 12. 
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 The US Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) is particularly important. It implements the 1996 WIPO 
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popular video-sharing website YouTube was engaging in massive intentional copyright violation for making 
available 160,000 unauthorized clips of Viacom’s entertainment programmes. The Court granted summary 
judgement for Google and basically held that mere and general knowledge of copyright infringement, no matter 
how widespread and clear, was not sufficient for Youtube not to benefit Section 512 exemption. 
16
 See inter alia  A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004 (Ninth Circuit, 2001); MGM Studios Inc v 
Grokster Ltd, 545 US 913 (US Supreme Court 2005); IO Group Inc. v Veoh Networks Inc. (U.S. District 
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Yet, file sharing is not limited to the exchange and copying of music or movie files. People 
also use these technologies in order to exchange information, ideas and opinions as well as 
to critic other people’s beliefs and in general to convey messages. File sharing is often used 
as a tool for finding works which would otherwise be unavailable, finding out new genres, 
carrying out personalized compilations as well as for posting creative remixes, sequels and 
new interpretations of existing works (including parody)17. It therefore provides far more 
opportunities than in the off line world for artists and authors to reach, analyze and further 
develop a great number of existing works. 
 
Several universities - especially in the US - use file sharing technologies to make easy the 
sharing of class notes, class assignments and other forms of content and it is believed that 
such networks have enhanced educational and research capabilities18. Viewed from this 
social and cultural perspective, file sharing can be considered as an activity that fosters a 
number of values underpinning the very protection of free speech. This is particularly true 
when it comes to P2P file sharing which – as shown above - enables the sharing of files by a 
direct exchange between end-users’ computers. Indeed, its decentralized feature (as opposed 
to centralized systems) permits users to create and disseminate countless kinds of resources, 
in manners which have never been possible earlier: in this case, the potential exchange of 
information and ideas is maximised. 
 
File sharing networks have thus become necessary components of many global virtual 
communities where for example information and cultural artefacts are shared and discussed 
in chat rooms19 or other virtual spaces. For several communities (e.g. academia, defense 
sector, etc.) file sharing has opened new scenarios and has become an important tool of 
cultural, scientific and technical collaboration. This is the main feature of the so-called “Web 
2.0” networks, also known as User Generated Content (UGC) services, which are generally 
associated with Internet applications that make easy interactive information sharing, 
interoperability and user-centered design. 
 
In a nutshell, file sharing and generally Internet technologies – by linking together 
communities of users, artists and creators (i.e. communities of people who are not just 
interested in copying music and movie files) - have the potential of dropping individuals’ 
                                                                                                                                                      
Court of California, 2008); Universal Music v Veoh (California Central District Court, 2009); Viacom Int'l Inc., 
et al., v. YouTube, Inc., et al., Nos. 07-Civ-2103 (LLS), 07-Civ-3582 (LLS) (US District Court New York 
2009); Arista v. Lime Wire (US District Court New York, 2010); Polydor v. Brown [2005] EWHC 3191 (Ch); 
Brein v Mininova , Rb Utrecht 26 August 2009, LJN BJ6008, 250077/HA ZA 08-1124; Pirate Bay, B 13301-
06, Stockholm District Court, Division 5, Unit 52, Verdict B [2009]; Universal Music Australia Pty Ltd v 
Sharman License Holdings Ltd [2005] FCA 1242; Roadshow Films Pty Ltd v. iiNET Limited (Federal Court of 
Australia 2010); SGAE (Sociedad General de Autores y Editores) v Jesus Guerra , Case N. 261/09, Barcelona 
Commercial Court N. 7, March 2010; Telecinco v YouTube (Madrid Commercial Court, September 2010). 
17
 Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, The 
University of Texas School of Law, Law and Economics Working Paper No 009, December 2009, p. 3 
(available on the Internet at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=468180). 
18
 Jason Putter, Copyright Infringement v. Academic Freedom on the Internet: Dealing with Infringing Use of 
Peer-To-Peer Technology on Campus Networks, J. L. & Pol’y 419 (2006), pp. 419-469, at. pp. 421 (note 5) and 
425. 
19
 Robert Danay, Copyright vs. Free Expression: The Case of Peer-to-Peer File-Sharing of Music in the United 
Kingdom, 8 Yale Journal of Law & Technology 32 (2005) (available on the Internet at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=847905, p. 20). 
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reliance on traditional mass media for information and entertainment and thus maximizing 
the exchange of ideas and opinions with a wider range of people20. 
 
Having said that, it seems that copyright owners are also keen in enforcing their exclusive 
rights against the above mentioned communities. The following case is self-explaining. In 
2003 the company Diebold Electronic Systems – producer of an electronic voting machines’ 
software - started sending cease-and-desist letters to US University students who had 
engaged in posting and circulating on the Internet Diebold’s internal communications21. In 
these communications (which consisted of both email messages and internal memorandums) 
various problems and flaws of Diebold’s software were highlighted. The files were 
circulated amongst students also by means of P2P file sharing technologies (and posted in 
various websites) and included thousands of e-mails highlighting bugs in Diebold’s software 
and warnings that its computer network was poorly protected against hackers 22. Warning 
letters were also sent by Diebold to ISPs which hosted the internal documents revealing 
flaws in Diebold’s e-voting machines. 
 
In the cease-and-desist letters Diebold invoked copyright infringement pursuant to the 
DMCA (it claimed that the files in question contained copyright protected material) and 
requested the documents to be removed. One ISP involved, Online Policy Group (OPG), 
refused to take them down invoking the right to free speech. 
 
Two students and the ISP OPG took action against Diebold alleging inter alia  that the 
former’s claim of copyright infringement was based on knowing material misrepresentation. 
The three plaintiffs sought a judicial declaration that the publication of the above 
communications was lawful and requested to enjoin Diebold from threatening or bringing 
any action for copyright infringement. 
 
The California district court found that Diebold knowingly misrepresented that online 
commentators, including the above college students, had violated the company’s copyrights. 
It was held that “No reasonable copyright holder could have believed that the portions of the 
email archive discussing possible technical problems with Diebold’s voting machines were 
protected by copyright”. The court added that Diebold tried to use copyright provisions “as a 
sword to suppress publication of embarrassing content rather than as a shield to protect its 
intellectual property” 23. 
 
This case shows that file sharing networks and Internet technologies in general can be used 
to foster freedom of speech, stimulate critical thinking as well as exert leverage on 
companies, government officials and politicians – and that copyright provisions may 
maliciously be invoked to stifle and chill said potentialities. These potentialities might be 
chilled also when copyright owners do not actually enforce their exclusive rights: this 
happens when speakers, artists or authors – being aware of the existence of copyright 
provisions allowing right owners to enforce their exclusive rights - prefer to engage in self-
                                                 
20
 Netanel, above note 6, p. 9. 
21
 Generally speaking, in that period US copyright owners in the creative content industries were very active in 
protecting their IPRs. Either they sent letters to hundreds of colleges and universities, requesting them to take 
action to prevent P2P infringement on campus networks, or they sent notices to universities detailing specific 
cases of unlawful file sharing on their networks. See Putter, above note 18, pp. 431-432. 
22
 See New York Times of 3 November 2003. 
23
 OPG v. Diebold, 337 F. Supp. 2d 1195, N.D. Cal. 2004. 
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censorship rather than running the risk of being sued and paying lots of money as 
compensation. 
 
We have seen that file sharing is not limited to music and movie works, but it also entails the 
exchange of other kind of information. 
 
In any case, it should be noted that also file sharing of music files does contribute to 
marketplace of ideas. It has been said that such exchange is increasingly perceived as a new 
form of “interest-based social interaction”24. Even the passive sharing of songs with 
unknown people sitting in front of their PC at the other corner of the globe is to be 
considered an important form of cultural exchange. Those websites permitting to share 
music, videos or other material and allowing people to leave comments regarding such 
material (e.g. YouTube) are pertinent examples. These Internet fora are comparable to big 
rooms where persons face-to-face exchange opinions, ideas and information25. P2P file 
sharing systems – by permitting that – may constitute a relevant part of several persons’ 
“sense of community, identity and therefore self-fulfillment”26. Sharing music files – coupled 
with the possibility of exchanging comments and points of view regarding songs – 
contributes to the evolution of music and boosts the cultural development of a given 
community. No doubt people who are exposed to more music are better prepared to offer 
their new ideas and solutions into the artistic community. 
 
Musical and in general artistic works are thus stimulated if there is massive exposure to (and 
creative appropriation of) previous works27 – and such exposure is particularly favored by 
the use of file sharing technologies. Any author needs access to previous works in order to 
create new music 28 – and without such access the creation of new music (and generally of 
new artistic forms) is hindered. It has been argued that the speech and art of previous authors 
and creators are the “raw material” of subsequent artists and authors29. Take the example of 
hip-hop or jazz music. It has been pointed out that these music genres developed and became 
successful as a consequence of the re-interpretation of previous works30. 
 
It could therefore be said that file sharing is another “engine of free speech”. People who 
employ this technology and use existing copyrighted pieces to create derivative works and 
thus express their opinion are no less deserving of protection and no less innovative than the 
author of the previous work31. 
 
Yet, one might stress that unauthorized file sharing is not “speech” and thus cannot be 
invoked as a tool for exercising freedom of expression. 
 
                                                 
24
 Daniel Gervais, The Price of Social Norms: Towards a Liability Regime for File-Sharing, Journal of 
Intellectual Property Law, 12.1 (2003), pp. 39-74, at. p. 41. 
25
 Netanel, above note 6, p. 74. 
26
 Danay, above note 19, p. 20. 
27
 Also classical composers like Beethoven and Mozart regularly took inspiration from already existing 
segments, motifs and themes. 
28
 See also Wendy J. Gordon, Copyright Norms and the Problem of Private Censorship, in Jonathan Griffiths – 
Uma Suthersanen (edited by), Copyright and Free Speech – Comparative and International Analyses, OUP 
(2005), pp. 67-96, at p. 67. 
29
 Netanel, above note 6, pp. 58-59. 
30
 Ibidem, pp. 19-22; Lea Shaver – Caterina Sganga, The Right to Take Part in Cultural Life: on Copyright and 
Human Rights, Wisconsin International Law Journal, pp. 637-662, at p. 645. 
31
 Netanel, above note 6, p. 29. 
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The reply would be easy, however. Indeed, it could be argued that music, movies and other 
artistic works do constitute “speech”, and that access to such existing speech and 
information – which is greatly enhanced by file sharing technology - is no less important to 
freedom of expression than is the making of the speech itself32. Indeed, the US Supreme 
Court has constantly affirmed that freedom of expression policy serves both “speakers” and 
“listeners”33. US policy in the telecommunication sector confirms the above, as US 
legislation has always guaranteed cheap access to programs, information and opinions 
throughout public libraries and free over-the-air television: and it has done so exactly with a 
view to boosting freedom of speech34. 
 
File sharing is instrumental to the system of free expression also because it strongly reduces 
the traditional copyright-supported media power of content supply and distribution. Thus, 
minor artists, creators and authors who are not associated to major labels, studios or 
publishers have the potential to access and reach a larger market of information, contents and 
ideas, and carry out creative appropriations and remixes of existing works: which in turn 
strengthens the cultural life and creativity of our society.  
 
6) Disconnecting Internet access of file sharers under French, UK and US law 
 
We have seen that the right to Internet connection has become more and more important, 
having acquired the same relevance as the right to other public goods, such as water, air, 
healthcare, education, etc. Internet allows people to use useful technologies (including file 
sharing networks) which boost and strengthen freedom of speech and generally artistic and 
cultural activities.  
 
Having said that, a few national legislations provide that Internet connection of persistent 
file sharers is terminated provided certain conditions are met. The author will briefly look at 
the recent French and UK laws, as well as at the relevant US provision. 
 
Preliminary, it should be noted that the decision of terminating users’ Internet access is very 
sensitive. In addition to eliminating a tool which has become vital in everyday life, it might 
negatively affect the entire family of the single alleged infringer, as a family usually relies 
on just one Internet subscription. 
 
The French scenario 
France has recently taken in serious consideration the phenomenon of on line copyright 
infringement and of unauthorized file sharing in particular. In May 2009 the first version of 
the so-called Hadopi law was adopted. This law aims at controlling and regulating Internet 
access as a means to encourage compliance with copyright provisions. It was lobbied by the 
French president Nicolas Sarkozy, who believed that a strong legislative action to react 
against online infringement of copyright was badly needed. 
This law has also created an ad hoc administrative agency, called Hadopi (Haute autorité de 
diffusion des oeuvres et de protection des droits sur internet), which has been given the 
task to control that “internet subscribers screen their Internet connections in order to 
                                                 
32
 Ibidem, p. 47. 
33
 See for example Red Lion Broad. Co. v. FCC, 395 U.S. 367, 390 (1969).  
34
 Netanel, above note 6, p. 47. 
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prevent the exchange of copyrighted material without prior agreement from the copyright 
holders” (Art. L. 336-3 French Intellectual Property Code). 
The law states that individual subscribers must ensure that their accounts are not accessed 
and used to reproduce or make available artistic works without the authorization of the 
copyright holder. It provides the so-called “three-strikes” rule, also labelled as “graduated 
response”: if subscribers fail to properly supervise their account within the year following 
the receipt of the first recommendation (and after a second recommendation has been sent to 
him), the administrative agency could - after an hearing - either suspend Internet access for 
between two months and a year (during which the subscriber is enjoined from entering into a 
service agreement with any other Internet service provider) or order subscribers to 
implement security measures aimed at preventing other unauthorized downloads or uploads, 
with penalty fees for non-compliance. 
Thus, one of the main features of this first version of the Hadopi law is the preeminent role 
of an administrative agency entrusted with the power to impose sanctions, including the 
disconnection of Internet access. Why has the first version of the Hadopi law provided that 
such a sanction be decided by an administrative body? It should be noted that judicial 
proceedings are usually expensive and slow: that might be a reason why a speeder and 
cheaper “extra-judicial” approach was initially chosen as opposed to a standard court 
proceedings35. 
This law was scrutinised by the French Constitutional Court, which in June 2009 found a 
part of it unconstitutional. As terminating individuals’ Internet access affects individuals’ 
right to free expression (which is a fundamental right), the French Constitutional Court held 
that any decision involving Internet disconnection should be taken by a court after a 
careful balancing of the two interests at stake, i.e. copyright protection and freedom of 
speech. As the Hadopi law gave an administrative agency the power to terminate 
individuals’ Internet access, the Court held such grant of authority as unconstitutional. And it 
specified that French Parliament was not at liberty to vest an administrative authority with 
such power in light of Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 
178936. 
The Constitutional Court’s finding that freedom of speech entails access to online 
communications services was also interesting. In particular, when commenting on the right 
enshrined in the above Article 11 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen, 
the court stressed that “in the current state of the means of communication and given the 
generalized development of public online communication services and the importance of the 
latter for the participation in democracy and the expression of ideas and opinions, this right 
implies freedom to access such services” (paragraph 12). Such finding not only clearly 
recognizes the importance of the right to have Internet access in the present era, but also 
impliedly affirms its fundamental nature. 
The French Constitutional Court also dealt with the following aspect of the Hadopi law, i.e. 
the fact that the burden of proof was placed on Internet subscribers. That meant that - in 
                                                 
35
 See also Alain Strowel, Introduction: peer-to-peer file sharing and secondary liability in copyright law, in 
Alain Strowel (edited by), Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright Law, Edward Elgar 
(2009), pp. 1-11, at p. 10. 
36
 This provision states that “the free communication of ideas and opinions is one of the most precious rights of 
man. Every citizen may thus speak, write and publish freely, except when such freedom is misused in cases 
determined by Law”. 
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order to be successful in the procedure – Internet subscribers had to prove that they were not 
liable for the alleged on-line infringement. In other words, subscribers should have proved 
that they properly secured their Internet access or that a third party was in fact responsible 
for the alleged infringement. According to the court, this boiled down in a presumption of 
guilt on Internet subscribers and was a violation of the constitutional principle of 
presumption of innocence37. 
On September 2009 the French parliament passed another bill (informally known as Hadopi 
2), which was intended to remedy the enforcement gap left by the Constitutional Court’s 
decision. The most relevant difference between the first version of the law and Hadopi 2 is 
that the sanctions to be applied against the alleged infringer will be decided by a court and 
not by the administrative agency (as indirectly recommended by the Constitutional Court). 
The entire process is still speeded up by the Hadopi-driven administrative procedure, 
however. 
The British scenario 
  
Also the UK has recently issued a law specifically aimed at fighting on line copyright 
infringements including unauthorized file sharing. It is the Digital Economy Act of April 
2010. 
 
A proposed code of practice which implements said Digital Economy Act has been adopted 
by Ofcom in June 201038. It is expected to come into force soon and requires ISPs to send 
notifications to their subscribers to inform them of allegations that their accounts have been 
used for copyright infringement, e.g. unauthorized file sharing. It also proposes a Hadopi-
like three stages process for ISPs to inform subscribers of copyright infringements and 
provides that subscribers which have received two notifications within a year (and have not 
stopped infringing copyright) may be included in a list requested by a copyright owner. This 
would be useful to copyright holders, who will then be able to take legal action against the 
alleged infringers. 
 
The most controversial provision of the Digital Economy Act is Section 17(1), which grants 
powers to the Secretary of State to disconnect people or slow their connections if they ignore 
warnings in case of alleged infringement. This provision states that “The Secretary of State 
may by regulations make provision about the granting by a court of a blocking injunction in 
respect of a location on the Internet which the court is satisfied has been, is being or is 
likely to be used for or in connection with an activity that infringes copyright”39 (emphasis 
added). 
 
Thus also the UK Digital Economy Act provides – at least in principle – the disconnection of 
Internet in case of on line copyright infringement. Yet, it also takes for granted that such 
                                                 
37
 See Article 9 of the Declaration of the Rights of Man and the Citizen of 1789, which states that “as all 
persons are held innocent until they shall have been declared guilty, if arrest shall be deemed indispensable, 
all harshness not essential to the securing of the prisoner’s person shall be severely repressed by law”. 
38
 The Ofcom is the UK independent telecommunications regulator and has been entrusted by the Digital 
Economy Act with the task to draw up and enforce a code of practice implementing the new provisions (the 
Code is available on the Internet at http://stakeholders.ofcom.org.uk/binaries/consultations/copyright-
infringement/summary/condoc.pdf).  
39
 However, according to the Ofcom draft code “The Secretary of State has not indicated his intention to make 
use of these provisions at this time and this consultation is not concerned with this aspect of the DEA [Digital 
Economy Act]”. 
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disconnection is to be decided by a judicial authority. The UK Parliament – in doing so – 
might have taken into consideration the above decision from the French Constitutional 
Court. Indeed Section 17(5) of the Digital Economy Act states that “in determining whether 
to grant an injunction, the court must take account of […] (e) the importance of freedom of 
expression”40. 
 
On the other hand, the presence of the words “likely to be used” in Section 17(1) has been 
perceived by the first commentators of the Act as worrying and risky. Don Foster, the 
Liberal Democrats’ spokesman for culture, media and sport, stressed that such a clause is too 
wide-ranging, as it would entail that a website containing suspected files could be blocked 
on its assumed intentions rather than its actions41. 
 
The US scenario 
 
What about the US? Does the DMCA make reference to Internet disconnection in case of on 
line copyright infringement? 
 
It does. Precisely, the DMCA makes reference to such sanction when dealing with the “safe 
harbour” exemption. Indeed, this exemption applies to ISPs provided they inter alia  have 
adopted and reasonably implemented a “policy that provides for the termination in 
appropriate circumstances of subscribers and account holders of the service provider’s 
system or network who are repeat infringers” (Section 512(i)(1)(A) DMCA). 
 
This provision does not clarify who should finally decide to impose such sanction, 
however42. The ISP which has adopted the policy in question? A judicial body? Thus far US 
courts have not given guidelines on that issue and on the meaning of the term “repeat 
infringers” in particular. 
 
An interpretation of this term has been given by David Nimmer: one may not be considered 
an infringer unless he has been found as such by a court43. Indeed, when the US Congress 
wanted to refer to individuals who were not proven infringers, it used the terms “claimed 
infringers” or “alleged infringers”. On the contrary in Section 512 – unlike in other DMCA 
provisions - the expression “repeat infringers” is used. This term should therefore refer to 
those against whom the infringement has been adjudicated, and not against whom it is 
merely alleged44. This interpretation appears to be in line with the second version of the 
                                                 
40
 Article 17(5)-(d) of the Act also states that courts – when granting injunctions preventing access to Internet – 
should take into consideration “whether the injunction would be likely to have a disproportionate effect on any 
person’s legitimate interests”. 
41
 See The Guardian of 8 April 2010. 
42
 What is clear is the purpose of this provision, i.e. to prevent future infringements by users. When enacting 
the DMCA, the US Congress noted that “those who repeatedly or flagrantly abuse their access to the Internet 
through disrespect for the intellectual property rights of others should know that there is a realistic  threat of 
losing that access” (H.R. Rep. No. 105-551, pt. 2, at 61, 1998). 
43
 Or unless an ISP has actual knowledge that an infringement has been committed. See David Nimmer, Repeat 
Infringers, Journal of the Copyright Society of the USA (2005), Vol. 52 Part 2, pp. 167-224, pp. 179-184. 
44
 Ibidem, p. 183. 
A recent Bill – presented on 20 September 2010 by Sen. Patrick Leahy – also deals with on-line copyright 
infringement including file sharing. It envisages the institution of a blacklist of websites (“dedicated to” or 
“primarily designed” for copyright infringing activities) which can be seized by the US Government. The 
actions would be taken by a state’s Attorney General, but there is no provision in the Bill requiring a hearing, 
trial or defence from the defendant. 
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Hadopi law and with the Digital Economy Act, which – as shown above – require Internet 
disconnection to be decided by a judicial authority. 
 
7) The EU perspective: the debate at the European Parliament on on-line copyright 
infringement and Internet disconnection and other relevant issues 
 
The issue of on-line copyright infringement and Internet disconnection has also been debated 
at the European Parliament during the negotiations which led to the adoption of the so-called 
“Telecom Package”. Such reform package was first presented by the former EU 
Commissioner Viviane Reading to the EU Parliament in 2007, with a view to changing the 
EU telecoms rules and particularly completing the internal market in the EU 
telecommunications industry. 
 
During these negotiations two positions emerged. 
 
On the one hand, the EU Council and the entertainment industry promoted a “three-strikes” 
rule managed by an administrative authority, a proposal very similar to the first version of 
the Hadopi law. 
 
On the other hand, the European Parliament and several advocacy groups promoting digital 
rights and freedom of expression lobbied a less strict and harsh solution, i.e. they claimed 
that Internet disconnection should be decided exclusively by courts and not by 
administrative bodies. Such groups expressly made reference to the ruling of the French 
Constitutional Court which – as shown above - stressed the importance of involving courts 
when it comes to deciding the termination of Internet access.  
 
In particular, the European Parliament promoted the so-called “amendment 138”, which had 
been embraced twice by a huge majority in the plenary assembly (88% of EU Parliament)45. 
This amendment sought to prevent EU member countries from adopting legislations 
allowing Internet disconnection of persistent file sharers without a previous authorisation of 
a court. It read as follows: 
  “Applying the principle that no restriction may be imposed on the fundamental rights 
and freedoms of end-users, without a prior ruling by the judicial authorities, notably 
in accordance with Article 11 of the Charter of Fundamental Rights of the European 
Union on freedom of expression and information, save when public security is 
threatened in which case the ruling may be subsequent” (emphasis added). 
 
Yet, such initial position of the European Parliament was last abandoned. On October 2009 a 
Parliament delegation - led by MEPs Catherine Trautmann and Alejo Vidal-Quadras - 
accepted to renounce to the above amendment and instead to work on a new amendment 
presented by the EU Council. The latter amendment is different from the above mentioned 
“amendment 138”: indeed, it no longer requires that only judicial authorities be allowed to 
cut off Internet access of persistent file sharers. It just says that any measures aimed at 
                                                 
45
 See e.g. European Parliament legislative resolution of 24 September 2008 on the proposal for a directive of 
the European Parliament and of the Council amending Directive 2002/21/EC on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services, Directive 2002/19/EC on access to, and 
interconnection of, electronic communications networks and associated facilities, and Directive 2002/20/EC on 
the authorisation of electronic communications networks and services (COM(2007)0697 – C6-0427/2007 – 
2007/0247(COD)), Brussels, 24 September 2008. 
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disconnecting Internet access may only be adopted “as a result of a prior, fair and impartial 
procedure”. The word “judicial” has been removed from the key sentence of the amendment. 
That means that the right to judicial review is guaranteed on appeal, but the first instance 
ruling can still be issued by a non-judicial authority. Such amendment brought about by the 
Telecom Package has been inserted into the EC Directive 2002/21 on a common regulatory 
framework for electronic communications networks and services (see the new Article 1, 
paragraph 3(a)46. 
 
This outcome has been criticised by several groups advocating freedom of speech on the 
Internet, as they believe that – also in view of the French Constitutional Court decision – it is 
important that disconnection of Internet access is to be decided exclusively by a judicial 
authority, and not by an administrative body47. It is thought that reserving to courts the 
power to issue such a harsh sanction would guarantee a stronger protection of the right to 
Internet access and accordingly of freedom of speech48. 
 
After the adoption of the Telecom Package, the European Parliament went on debating 
issues related to the online infringement of intellectual property rights. Indeed a resolution 
was approved on 22 September 201049, stressing that unauthorised uploading of copyrighted 
material on the Internet is a clear infringement of IPRs prohibited by both the WIPO 
Copyright Treaty (WCT) and the WIPO Performances and Phonograms Treaty (WPPT)50. 
 
Yet this resolution does not mention what has been highlighted earlier, i.e. that file sharing 
also involves the exchange of information useful to form and express people’s opinion. The 
Socialist group in the European Parliament had proposed amendments to the previous draft 
of the resolution (the Gallo Report) with a view to stressing the above. Such amendments 
(which were not accepted) mainly regarded the recognition of “non-commercial file sharing 
for personal use” and an alternative remuneration scheme to compensate this use (private 
copying): the aim was to distinguish between counterfeiting of goods and the less dangerous 
on line IPRs infringements. 
 
                                                 
46
 See also above note 11. 
47
 Pro freedom of expression groups take this critical view even though the new Article 1, paragraph 3(a) 
Directive 2002/21 (inserted as a result of the adoption of the Telecom Package) takes the pain to specify that 
any measures liable to restrict fundamental rights or freedoms may only be imposed if it is appropriate, 
proportionate and necessary within a democratic society, and shall be subject to adequate procedural safeguards 
in conformity with the European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms 
(see again above note 11). 
It has also been said that the European Parliament was betrayed by their delegates, the MEPs Catherine 
Trautmann and Alejo Vidal-Quadras, as they accepted to unilaterally renounce to the old amendment 138 
apparently in contradiction with the mandate given by their colleagues representing the EU Parliament. See the 
web-pages of the advocacy group La Quadrature du Net at http://www.laquadrature.net/en/amendment-138-
the-parliament-betrayed-by-its-negotiators. 
48
 The issue was also debated during the negotiations which led to the Anti-Counterfeiting Trade Agreement 
(ACTA), an international agreement signed by a group of (mainly) industrialized countries on 15 November 
2010 and that establish new international standards on IPRs. See Annemarie Bridy, ACTA and the Specter of 
Graduated Response, June 2010, p. 5 (available on the Internet at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1619006). Yet, the final version of the ACTA does not 
refer to the disconnection of Internet access as a possible sanction for deterring on-line copyright infringement. 
49
 See European Parliament Resolution of 22 September 2010 on enforcement of intellectual property rights in 
the internal market (2009/2178(INI)). This resolution takes origin from a report drafted by the MEP Marielle 
Gallo, which was firstly voted on June 2010 by the Legal Affairs Committee of the EU Parliament (so-called 
“Gallo Report”). 
50
 Recital L of the resolution. 
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Instead, the resolution in question made no substantial difference between counterfeiting and 
unauthorised file sharing, leading to believe that the two activities are identical and should 
be treated in the same way and be subject to the same sanctions51: the risk is that ordinary 
citizens sharing online copyrighted material (including people sharing files merely with a 
view to enjoying and commenting existing works, without any lucrative purpose) can be 
treated like criminal organizations devoted to counterfeiting52. 
 
8) The role of private agreements between copyright holders and ISPs 
 
As already noted, it is important that decisions ordering the disconnection of Internet access 
of file sharers be taken exclusively by courts. 
 
In recent years, however, copyright owners have entered into a number of agreements with 
ISPs, obliging the latter to adopt graduated response regimes which envisage the possibility 
of terminating Internet access of unauthorized file sharers. It therefore seems that suing file 
sharers in court is not anymore the main solution pursued by right holders to combat on line 
copyright infringement. Instead a strategy of compelled voluntary collaboration with ISPs 
seems now to be more popular: which confirms that public law is not anymore the only 
vehicle through which graduated response regimes and decisions on Internet disconnection 
can be taken53. Indeed, private law mechanisms driven by market forces are more and more 
used by copyright owners to pursue enforcement measures. 
 
Such agreements are becoming popular, especially in the US. Annemarie Bridy brought 
interesting examples of collaboration agreements entered into in the US between copyright 
owners and ISPs (according to which ISPs undertake to forward notices of infringement to 
their subscribers): it seems that in some cases leading ISPs have suspended Internet access of 
persistent file sharers without any court order or other finding of an infringement54. The 
same reportedly occurs in other countries, including Ireland where a graduate response 
regime has become a common rule for over 40% of Irish Internet subscribers as a result of a 
settlement agreement between major films distributors and the most important Irish ISP 
(Eircom): this regime does not envisage the involvement of any court and said ISP is the 
only “judge” who decides whether the subscriber deserves or not to have its Internet 
connection terminated55. 
 
The “transformation” of ISPs into copyright’ enforcement agents is probably a consequence 
of a do ut des strategy. There are signals that ISPs act as entertainment industry enforcement 
agents in exchange for them acquiring the right to transmit copyright holders’ programs over 
                                                 
51
 See for example paragraph 45 of the resolution. 
52
 These concerns do not seem to be adequately addressed by a mere reference (contained in paragraph 5 of the 
resolution) that any measure to enforce IPRs must respect the fundamental rights enshrined in the Charter of 
Fundamental Rights of the European Union and the European Convention on Human Rights. 
53
 Bridy, above note 49, p. 10. 
54
 Ibidem, pp. 7-10. With reference to these agreements see also Michael P. Murtagh, The FCC, the DMCA, 
and Why Takedown Notices Are Not Enough, Hastings Law Journal, Vol. 61 (2009), pp. 246 et sqq. 
55
 Bridy, above note 49, pp. 14-15. This outcome is worrying as previous case law of the Irish High Court had 
clarified that ISPs should not be considered liable for their customers downloads nor did Irish law envisage any 
provision mentioning a “three strikes” rule. 
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their Internet networks56. Right holders and ISPs’ interests are therefore becoming more and 
more convergent and aligned57. 
 
It has been argued that these agreements may represent a first step in the context of a “more 
complete private ordering of the project of online copyright infringement”58. They also seem 
to be encouraged at international level, particularly by the recently-approved Anti-
Counterfeiting Trade Agreement (ACTA)59. Article 2(18)(3) of this treaty promotes 
“cooperative efforts within the business community to effectively address […] copyright or 
related rights infringement […]”. Commentators do not rule out that this provision could be 
interpreted as requiring states to set up regimes encouraging ISPs to enforce copyrights on 
behalf of right owners, and particularly to take decisions affecting Internet connectivity of 
unauthorized file sharers60. 
 
The private agreements in question seem to penalize too much file sharers. Let’s take for 
example the US scenario. 
 
These agreements usually provide that ISPs merely forward to alleged infringers the so-
called “DMCA take down notices”. Said notices are envisaged by Section 512(c) DMCA 
and are basically information - from the right holder to the user - saying that the former has a 
good faith belief that the latter has violated its copyright. Several agreements between 
copyright holders and ISPs provide that – after forwarding to users these notices on behalf of 
right owners and should other alleged violations occur – ISPs are entitled to suspend and 
even terminate users’ Internet connection. 
 
The above contractual provisions are risky for users insofar as the collaboration between 
right holders and ISPs – and a possible final decision suspending or terminating users’ 
Internet access – is exclusively based on DMCA take down notices. Indeed, such notices are 
not always precise and reliable, as they reflect just the right holders’ point of view, i.e. what 
they claim it is an infringement of their copyright. They do not require ISPs to find out 
whether a copyright infringement has really occurred. It has been argued that take down 
notices are “flawed, easy to generate, often meritless, and an inadequate substitute for a full 
trial on the merits”61; in fact they are issued unilaterally by right holders without the 
involvement of neutral adjudicators such as a court or a panel of arbitrators, and therefore 
without a strong proof of actual infringement. 
 
9) Article 10 European Convention on Human Rights and file sharing 
 
It is also worthwhile to verify whether invoking copyright against unauthorized file sharers 
is in line with the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). 
                                                 
56
 Bridy, above note 8, pp. 22-23 (pointing out that the ISP Verizon reached an agreement with the company 
Disney to forward infringement notices to users, in exchange for receiving the right to transmit Disney’s 
programs). 
57
 Murtagh, above note 54, p.  257. 
58
 Bridy, above note 8, p. 6. 
59
 See above note 48. 
60
 See the Internet website of the advocacy group La Quadrature du Net at www.laquadrature.net/en/final-
version-of-acta-must-be-rejected-as-a-whole. It should however be noted that Article 2(18)(3) ACTA also 
provides that the cooperative efforts in question should take place “while preserving legitimate competition and 
consistent with each Party’s law, preserving fundamental principles such as freedom of expression, fair 
process, and privacy”. On this issue see also Bridy, above note 48, p. 6. 
61
 Murtagh, above note 54, p. 257. 
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The starting point is Article 10(1) ECHR: “Everyone has the right to freedom of expression. 
This right shall include freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and 
ideas without interference by public authority and regardless of frontiers. […]” 
 
We have seen that file sharing - by giving users the possibility of exchanging information, 
ideas and reflections - has the potential to promote and boost freedom of speech. 
 
However, the right to free speech cannot be considered in a vacuum, but it should be 
balanced with other rights. That is why Article 10(2) ECHR states that “the exercise of these 
freedoms, since it carries with it duties and responsibilities, may be subject to such 
formalities, conditions, restrictions or penalties as are prescribed by law and are necessary 
in a democratic society […] for the protection of the reputation or the rights of others” 
(emphasis added). 
 
This provision tells us that freedom of speech can be lawfully restricted if the restriction is 
inter alia  “necessary in a democratic society”. 
 
The European Court of Human Rights has never overtly faced the conflict between copyright 
and freedom of speech. Rather, such conflict has been specifically analysed by the European 
Commission of Human Rights62. In particular, in an important decision of 1997 the latter 
stated that in principle copyright protection constitutes a significant limitation to freedom of 
speech63. Yet it added that copyright protection can lawfully restrict freedom of speech as 
long as the requirements of Article 10(2) ECHR are met. 
 
Said that, it is important to verify whether enforcing copyright against unauthorized file 
sharers – which is capable of restricting freedom of expression – can be considered 
“necessary in a democratic society”. If it cannot be considered as such (and provided the 
other conditions of Article 10(2) are met), the enforcement activity in question could be 
deemed contrary to Article 10 ECHR. 
 
In answering the above question the author makes reference to an interesting paper by 
Robert Danay which mainly focuses on music file sharing64. 
 
Danay argues that – in order to determine if restricting music file sharing is necessary in a 
democratic society – we should verify whether such restriction is really useful to meet 
copyright’s purposes. Which are the objectives pursued by copyright legislation? (i) The 
securing of a reward for the authors and (ii) the promotion and encouragement of creativity. 
Said that, the next question to be answered is the following: is the restriction of freedom of 
speech (brought about by enforcing copyright against file sharers) useful to meet the above 
copyright’s purposes? Danay believes that in most cases it might not be useful. He then 
concludes that in most cases restricting freedom of expression by enforcing copyright 
against music file sharers is not necessary in a democratic society and accordingly not in 
conformity with Article 10 ECHR. 
 
How does Danay reach this conclusion? 
                                                 
62
 Protocol 11 of the European Convention on Human Rights, which came into force in 1998, abolished the 
Commission. 
63
 European Commission of Human Rights, France 2 c. France, 15-1-1997, n. 30262/96. 
64
 Danay, above note 19. 
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He argues first of all that file sharing does not seem to really affect music sales. This 
assertion seems to have its merits. Indeed, file sharing can even augment music sales, as 
such phenomenon has the potential to bring artists’ music (especially minor artists’ music, 
who represent the majority) in direct contact with potential consumers65. Moreover, statistics 
about the traffic of file sharing networks can turn out to be useful to copyright owners: e.g. 
they can reveal the world areas where new artists are most famous, even before the release of 
their works, so that right owners can better target their overall sale strategies66. It follows 
that, as long as file sharing is capable of increasing right holders’ business opportunities, 
copyright restrictions vis-a’-vis such phenomenon do not secure rewards for authors nor 
promote the diffusion of music. 
 
Even if it is assumed that file sharing does negatively affect music sales (for example, in 
terms of less CDs sales), overall the remuneration received by copyright holders would not 
be diminished. In fact, Danay’s argument goes, file sharing network is capable of boosting 
and promoting related activities such as advertising and merchandising (e.g. it might 
encourage the sale of posters, t-shirts, etc. of the artists in question) as well as public 
appearances, which remain the primary resources of revenue for copyright holders. This 
would entail again that copyright restrictions vis-a’-vis file sharing do not secure rewards for 
authors nor promote the diffusion of music. Again, the conclusion would be that restricting 
freedom of expression by enforcing copyright against file sharers is not necessary in a 
democratic society. 
 
Danay finally argues that – even if we take for granted that file sharing negatively affects 
music sales – nonetheless the availability of alternative systems of compensation which do 
not impose sanctions as tough as the ones provided in case of copyright infringement (e.g. 
private copying levies) would still guarantee a reward for all copyright holders. Such 
alternative systems – which should replace an enforcement system based exclusively on the 
prohibition of unauthorized uses - would still compensate copyright owners for the use of 
their works by the file sharer, without however imposing harsh sanctions against the latter 
and chilling his freedom of expression. That is another reason why Danay believes that 
enforcing copyright against file sharers - and the subsequent restriction of freedom of speech 
- cannot be considered necessary in a democratic society. 
 
10) Recommendations to reconcile copyright holders’ interests with freedom of speech 
concerns in the digital environment  
 
How to reconcile copyright holders’ interests with the right to free speech of file 
sharers’users? 
 
Two sets of recommendations are here highlighted. 
 
                                                 
65
 For example, the song Crazy from the artist Gnarls Barkley was available as an illegal download since 
Autumn 2005, but it was so popular that – when it became available for legal downloads in 2006 – the song 
went at the top of the charts. See Robert Clark, Sharing out online liability: sharing files, sharing risks and 
targeting ISPs, in Alain Strowel (edited by), Peer-to-Peer File Sharing and Secondary Liability in Copyright 
Law, Edwar Elgar (2009), pp. 196-228, p. 196. 
66
 See The Economist, 19 July 2008, p. 18. 
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(i) The first set relates to the thorny issue of who should decide Internet disconnection of 
unauthorized file sharers. (ii) The second group of proposals aims at identifying possible 
areas of freedom for unauthorized file sharers.  
 
(i) As shown above, enforcing copyright against file sharers – especially if this involves 
disconnection of users’ Internet access – might jeopardize their right to free speech. 
 
First of all, as also suggested by the French Constitutional Court, any decision regarding 
Internet disconnection should be taken exclusively by a judicial body. Indeed, terminating 
users’ Internet access affects individuals’ right to free expression and we deem it fair that 
such an encroachment of a fundamental right be sanctioned by a court (rather, e.g., than an 
administrative agency). 
 
Moreover, should we accept such an important decision be taken by ISPs in their role as 
copyright owners’ agents? In other terms: should we accept that a private cooperation 
agreement between right holders and an ISP let the latter act as copyright “policeman” and 
terminate alleged infringers’ Internet connection, by solely relying on DMCA take down 
notices (or other similar notices) from right owners? 
 
The author does believe that such private cooperation agreements giving ISPs the power to 
terminate users’ Internet access could be accepted provided said users have been adjudicated 
to commit copyright infringement by a judicial body. When it comes to deciding to encroach 
a fundamental right such as the right to Internet, private contractual negotiations cannot 
replace judges. Public law here should retain its exclusive competence. We cannot run the 
risk of letting market forces deal with such a sensitive issue, also in view of the fact that 
DMCA take down notices (or other similar notices) – on which these agreements often rely – 
might be flawed and can lead to blame users in good faith and not liable of any actual 
infringement67. 
 
(ii) Would it be possible to adopt a more libertarian approach, i.e. to guarantee people 
(especially authors and artists) more freedom to share copyrighted material on the Internet? 
 
Several proposals have been put forward to guarantee file sharers some areas of freedom and 
are all based on a “compensation right” approach. These solutions should substitute the 
traditional copyright paradigm exclusively based on the unconditional enjoyment of hollow 
exclusive rights68. They basically aim at saving the benefits of file sharing technologies 
while at the same time guaranteeing authors’ compensation69: a kind of solution which might 
be labeled – by using Lawrence Lessig’s words 70 - as “compensation without control”. It is 
                                                 
67
 For cases of flawed take down notices see Murtagh, above note 54, pp. 254-255. 
68
 Jane C. Ginsburg, Copyright control v compensation: the prospects for exclusive rights after Grokster and 
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believed that transforming copyright from a proprietary right to a compensation right would 
better serve freedom of expression71. 
 
A specific proposal has been put forward by Neil Netanel, and it is based on the so-called 
Noncommercial Use Levy (NUL)72. Such levy would be imposed on the sale of any 
consumer product or service whose value is substantially enhanced by P2P file sharing, the 
amount being determined by an ad hoc Copyright Office Court. These products or services 
could include consumer electronic devices (e.g. MP3 players, CD burners and digital video 
recorders) used to copy, store, send or perform shared and downloaded files. The levy should 
be paid by the providers of these products and services, and the distribution of the proceeds 
to copyright holders should be carried out taking into consideration the popularity of the 
works and the actual use of the contents as measured by technology tracking and monitoring 
such use. As a consequence of the payment of this levy, users could freely copy and circulate 
any works the right holder has made available on the Internet: of course the use of the works 
should not be a commercial one. As Netanel points out, this system would give users and 
creators more freedom to explore, transform and adapt existing works (in such a way 
boosting freedom of expression), while at the same time rewarding copyright holders and 
thus maintaining the main essence and purpose of copyright73.  
 
The proposal from Netanel has its merits. Generally speaking, several commentators stress 
that copyright holders in the Internet age will be soon rewarded by mainly using levies and 
taxes74. It is believed that either the exclusive rights traditionally granted by copyright are 
not easily enforceable in the Internet world or their enforcement would jeopardize the free 
exchange of information on the Internet. That is why levy-based proposals might soon 
become reality in the Internet environment. 
 
A regime of government compensation to right holders paid out of general tax revenues 
(with subsequent freedom to share and copy copyrighted material available on line) has also 
been proposed75. Generally speaking, recommendations to substitute IPRs regimes with 
systems of government compensation have been debated for a long time. Such proposal 
would not be very different from the above NUL, except that right holders would be paid 
from a body funded by general tax revenues rather than by levies imposed on certain 
products and services. 
  
Some commentators have also proposed compulsory licences to authorize and regulate the 
P2P distribution of copyright protected works on the Internet. As is known, compulsory 
licenses are usually granted by governments, or governmental bodies, and oblige IPRs 
owners to licence the protected asset to third parties willing to use it. Lawrence Lessig 
believes that the US Congress should empower file sharing by recognizing a system of 
compulsory licencing similar to that used in cable retransmission, and the amount of the 
relevant fees would not be set by right holders, but by policy makers keen on striking a fair 
balance76. 
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In principle compulsory licencing schemes – by permitting users to access and share works 
on the Internet - would aim at favoring the circulation of copyrighted works on the Internet 
and thus boosting freedom of speech. Yet, other commentators are skeptical about the 
feasibility of implementing such a system, as they believe that compulsory licences have 
proved to be unsuccessful in implementing public policy goals77. This opinion is buttressed 
by the fact that so far no compulsory licences have been granted to authorize the P2P 
distribution of copyrighted works on the Internet. 
 
All the above proposals have common features and purposes, i.e. they all aim at making the 
digital environment and particularly the Internet a virtual place where public debate, artistic 
creativity and cultural diversity should coexist with commercial transactions78. Therefore 
such recommendations do not tend to wipe out copyright (which is still an “engine to free 
speech”), but try to strike a balance between the latter and the right to freely access 
copyrighted works available on the Internet, which is ancillary to the fundamental right to 
free speech. 
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